This paper presents the first evaluation of the French Disabled Workers Act of 1987, which aimed to promote the employment of disabled people in the private sector. We use a panel data set, which includes both the health and the labour market histories of workers. We account both for unobserved heterogeneity and for the change in the disabled population over time. We find that the law had a negative impact on the employment of disabled workers in the private sector. This counterproductive effect likely comes from the possibility to pay a fine instead of hiring disabled workers.
Introduction
In its 30th anniversary press release, the French institution dealing with the professional insertion of disabled people in the private sector (the AGEFIPH in French) asserted that the employment rate of disabled people in the private sector has regularly increased over the period to reach 4% of the total workforce in 2015 (5.3% in the public sector according to the annual report of the FIPHFP, the public counterpart of the AGEFIPH). The number of disabled people in employment has risen by 30% between 2011 and 2015. 1 But the following figures tend to prove that margins of progress remain: 9% of private employers still prefer paying the penalty than hiring disabled people and only two-thirds of the 6% quota is completed. Finally, the unemployment rate of disabled people remains twice higher than the one of the other workers.
The implementation of the French Disabled Workers Act of 1987 is a cornerstone for public policies aiming at integrating disabled people into the society and more especially into the labour market. Indeed, whereas some previous laws (that of 1957 and 1975) already introduced a legal quota of disabled workers for firms, it was the first time that private organizations, employing at least 20 workers, were given financial incentives to comply with it (by making them pay a financial compensation in case of non-compliance). This law was completed by a second one in 2005 to enlarge the obligation of employment of disabled people to the public sector and to raise the level of financial compensations for non-compliance. Whether this succession of institutional changes succeeds in improving the professional insertion of disabled people while making employers participate actively to this objective is an important issue. Moreover, as many countries are concerned, the evaluation of the efficiency of the policies promoting the employment of disabled workers seems to be needed.
In a wide range of EU countries, public policies, using a combination of quotas and taxes aiming at increasing the employment rate of disabled workers, were adopted too [21] . Yet, in each country, quotas differ according to the size of the financial penalty, the types of employment subsidies and the characteristics of the social welfare system. Moreover, quotas can also vary depending on the type of employer (and thus the tax base). In Italy, for instance, contrary to Spain and Belgium, a mix of quotas and huge financial penalties has been implemented. In Germany, the employment obligation, set up at the beginning of the twentieth century, has consisted in the implementation of quotas (5% both for the public and private sectors since the 1974 Law).
It represents the main component of the policy promoting the integration of disabled workers in the labour market. In the UK, the Disabled Persons Employment Act of 1944 introduced a quota system of 3% for companies employing over 20 employees, along with protective measures against the dismissal of disabled people and a policy of arranged jobs for disabled persons. As in Germany, the law was little applied. Then in 1995, a new law implementing the principle of non-discrimination against disabled people has been enacted (the Disability Discrimination Act or DDA). This DDA forbids employers in establishments over 20 employees to treat differently workers on the grounds of disability without any justified reasons. Notably, employers have to set up the necessary arrangements that promote employment for disabled individuals (for instance, changes in working conditions, job adaptation...). 2 Integrating disabled people into the labour market is an important, but non-trivial, issue. Indeed, it relies on the interaction between labour supply and demand. From the supply side, the low probability of employment for disabled people could be due to disability insurance (moral hazard issue well documented by the literature). From the demand side, it could be explained by firms' willingness to discriminate disabled people (taste-based or statistical discrimination) or by the fact that firms do not want to bear the costs of workplace adjustments. From a social point of view, these situations are suboptimal and imply the implementation of public policies to overcome these "market failures", one of them being the existence of a legal quota enforced by financial penalties.
Evaluating the efficiency of such policies by estimating the nature and the scope of their causal effect on the level of employment of disabled people raises methodological issues. The effects due to labour supply characteristics (activity sector, public/private status, firm size, …) have to be disentangled from those of labour demand (gender, level of education, type of handicap,…) by controlling for every potential confounding factors (e.g. a change in disability insurance policies, the economic context, structural reforms on the labour market, …).
The aim of this paper was to evaluate the causal impact of the Disabled Workers Act of 1987 on the employment of disabled people. The French Ministry of Labour already provided a descriptive study about the evolution of the employment of disabled people after the implementation of the law [1] . Yet, this work was not designed to identify a causal effect and failed to take into account the confounding factors which can affect the employment of disabled workers regardless of the reform (individual characteristics, firms' and sector's characteristics, institutional and economic context). That was the aim of the present study.
We assume that a quota system of disabled workers coupled with financial penalties in case of non-compliance can influence the labour demand of both disabled and non-disabled workers. Indeed, employers are likely to adopt strategic hiring behaviours to cope with quotas and escape fines. Consequently, it seems of interest to control whether this law met its objective to make private and public organizations employing more disabled people.
To do that, we build a panel which allows for identifying the exact onset and length of a disability. To comply with the perimeter of the law, and as we do not have administrative data, we regard as "officially recognised disabled people" every person who self-reported either a disability recognised by the Technical Commission for Professional Orientation and Reclassification or a partial or total inability to work as recognised by physicians employed by the statutory health insurance or occupational physicians. Our approach is midway between the medical and social models of disability and is not too far from the definition of disability given by the US American with Disabilities Act (ADA). 3 Finally, we use a triple difference methodology, with matching and weighting methods, to disentangle the specific effect of the law by comparing the employment trajectories of comparable disabled people before and after the implementation of the law.
We find that the 1987 Disabled Workers Act had a detrimental effect on the employment rate of disabled people in the private sector. Two years after the reform, the employment rate decreases by 13.9 pp, and by 17.2 pp 5 years later. We find no significant effect of the reform for the public sector which was not in the perimeter of the reform in practice (but may benefit from a crowding-in effect). As already observed by the French Ministry of Labour [1] , employers seem to have preferred paying financial penalties than directly hiring or maintaining the employment of disabled people.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows: "Policy background" settles the French policy background. "Previous literature" deals with the literature review. "Data" describes the data and the methodology used in this paper. "Results" presents the empirical results which are discussed in "Discussion and conclusion".
Policy background
The obligation to employ disabled workers dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the definition of the population eligible as "disabled workers" and the exact meaning of the employment obligation have evolved over time. The first population concerned with the obligation of employment consisted war-wounded veterans after the World War I (Law of March 31th 1919).
The eligible population has been enlarged to people who were victims of work-related accident in 1930, and to severely infirm people, in 1949. All establishments employing at least ten workers have to hire directly disabled people representing at least 10% of their workforce. The expression "disabled workers" appeared for the first time in the Law of November 23th 1957 with the following meaning: "any person whose opportunities to obtain or maintain employment are effectively reduced as a result of inadequate or impaired physical or mental abilities". Institutions in charge of giving an official recognition of disability were created at the local level. A "sheltered sector" appeared at the same time and was regulated by the Law of June 30th 1975 which also acknowledged fundamental rights to disabled people (notably the right to work in priority in the standard job market and to have access to every institution like every citizens) and extends the employment obligation of disabled workers to the public sector ("reserved employment"). But this law, although proclaiming the willingness to integrate disabled person in all the spheres of the society, did not contain enforcing properties (such as financial penalties) and failed to reach its goals.
In this context, the French Disabled Workers Act of July 10th 1987, which first introduced what we called today the "Employment Obligation of Disabled Workers" (OETH in French), is tailored to raise the incentives to employers to hire disabled workers, in the private sector and a small part of the public sector. The OETH concerns all establishments employing at least 20 workers for more than 3 years, both in the public and the private sectors. It concerns both parttime and full-time jobs. It imposes a legal quota of 3% of the total workforce, progressively raised to 4% in 1989 and 6% in 1991. The compliance control was different for the public and the private sectors. The private sector employers had to report the composition of their workforce and to pay a financial penalty in case of non-compliance. The public sector had no obligation to report and no penalty in case of non-compliance. This is why it is generally considered that the law concerned exclusively the private sector.
Yet, this law also gave the opportunity to employers to comply with the legal quota by different ways: by hiring directly disabled workers, by hiring indirectly disabled workers through the signature of outsourcing contracts with the "sheltered sector", which provides either jobs or training placements for disabled workers. Outsourcing is restricted to one-half of the quota. In case on non-compliance, the firms pay financial penalties to the AGEFIPH. To determine the penalty, a theoretical number of missing disabled workers is first computed [1] . It accounts for the disability severity, the age and the type of labour contract of the disabled workers already hired by the firm. The financial penalties then depend on the establishment's size, from 300 h at the minimum wage for each missing disabled worker for establishments employing between 20 and 199 people, up to 500 h at the minimum wage for each missing disabled worker for the establishments employing 750 people and more. 4 
Previous literature
A large literature shows the deleterious impact of a disability's onset on labour outcomes (in UK, Lindeboom et al. [18] and Jones [15] ; in France, Barnay et al. [3] ; in Australia, Polinado and Vu [22] ; in Germany, Lechner and VazquezAlvarez [17] ; in USA, Webber and Bjelland [27] ). In addition, some papers attempt to evaluate policies promoting the employment of disabled people (recruitment or job retention) by influencing either labour demand or labour supply.
Labour market supply-side policies tend to focus either on the causal impact of disability onset on employment outcomes or on the limitation of threshold effects and moral hazard problems induced by the disability insurance programs. For example, Lindeboom et al. [18] estimate an event-history model using the British National Child Development Study (NCDS). Using unscheduled hospitalizations as an instrument, they estimate the causal effects of the onset of a disability on later employment outcomes. They find that a large part of the association between disability and employment can be attributed to a causal effect, particularly for less-educated male workers, whereas the remaining part is due to selection, mostly for women. Similar results concerning less-educated workers are obtained by Polidano and Vu [22] .
Campolieti and Riddell [6] analyse the impact of two public disability compensation policies on the probability of employment for disabled individuals in Canada. They identify a significant positive effect of the introduction of a minimum wage threshold on returning to work for insured people with a long-term and severe disability (i.e. lasting at least 1 year).
The literature also estimates the elasticity of employment to disability compensation schemes. Staubli [23] , for example, examines the Austrian data for the effect of the strengthening of the disability insurance eligibility criteria on labour participation. He identifies a statistically significant positive effect on labour market participation in the private sector for disabled men aged over 55 years, with an increase from 1.6 to 3.4 points. Marie and Vall-Castello [19] , who use Spanish data concerning people of age 55 years and more suffering from a partial disability, find that the increase of 36% in the amount of disability pensions reduced the probability to be employed by 8%. More recently, Frutos and Castello [9] underline that the likelihood to be employed is 5% lower for individuals receiving disability benefits. Finally, based on South African data, Mitra [20] shows that a less intensive disability screening, which allows individuals to benefit from a compensation, implied an increase in the non-employment rate by 8.6% for the 45-to 64-year-old men.
Labour market demand-side policies are dedicated to the reduction of discrimination against disabled people [2, 4, 5, 13, 14] . They proceed by either using economic incentives such as labour cost deductions [25] or by combining hiring quotas for disabled workers and financial penalties in case of non-compliance [16, 26] . Vall-Castello [25] evaluates the effects of the policy promoting employment among disabled women in Spain and shows a significant effect of the labour cost deductions for employers.
Closer to our study, Wagner et al. [26] and more recently Lalive et al. [16] evaluate the impact of a quota policy with financial penalties on the employment of disabled workers. Both articles examine whether there is a discontinuity between firms in the vicinity of the legal quota of disabled workers. Wagner et al. [26] do not find any significant differences between companies where quota applies and others, whereas Lalive et al. [16] do.
Our study contributes to the applied literature on the three following points: First, we provide the first economic evaluation of the 1987 French Disabled Workers Act. Second, we account for the differences between the public and private sectors. Third, we apply a triple difference innovative method, which decomposes the variation of the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) before and after the reform, so as to account for changes in the disabled population structure.
Data
The SIP (Health and Labour Market Histories) Survey was designed within the framework of a partnership between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour, with scientific support from the Center for Employment Studies (CEET). The implementation thereof was carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). The first wave, in 2006, retrospectively questions 14,000 persons aged between 20 and 74 years and living in ordinary households in France on their life paths (family, professional and health status) and gives a detailed description of these different dimensions at the time of the survey. It provides an individual/year panel specifying, for each period, individual, professional and health. A retrospective calendar allows identifying the exact date of the disability onset, the length of the disability and the evolution of the labour market status (including public and private sector employment). It makes possible to examine how an individual's career is affected by a health shock through a rigorously constructed counterfactual. The SIP Survey mainly aims at two objectives: on the one hand, to better understand health determinants, by defining health status in regard with employment status and career path and, on the other hand, to measure both the incidence of the health status, defined in a the broad sense, on people's career paths, career risks and the potential discrimination they may face.
Our performance variables describe the employment of individuals for each year since the entry in the labour market. We use dummy variables for employment in the public sector and employment in the private sector. To estimate the effect of a disability on the employment status, for example during the year following its occurrence, we analyse whether the distribution of the treated according to these three dummies has been altered differently from that of the non-treated. The segregation between public and private employment is motivated by the differences in the context of professional integration of disabled persons, and stronger enforcement incentives in the private sector. By construction, the effect of a disability on total employment can be obtained by adding the effects on public and private employments. We observe people's performance in the labour market during the 5 years following the disability onset.
The SIP Survey does not include administrative data, only self-reported disabilities and their potential links to changes in their professional situations. Disabilities are identified in various ways in the SIP questionnaire and along with the retrospective calendar (submitted with the questionnaire). They are self-reported regardless of whether they are explicitly related to professional events.
In this survey, 2095 respondents experienced at least one disability from their birth until 2006. The SIP Survey inquired the origin of the disability, which, through a meticulous study of the verbatim data, made it possible to correct the raw data encoded as "other". We finally identified the causes of the disability for 98% of the sample: accidents explain 41% of the disabilities and one-third of them are due to an illness or another health problem. To study the effect of the occurrence of disability on the labour market status, we only consider individuals who have completed their initial education. Among them, 1777 have experienced at least one disability after their initial education.
As this large definition of disability does not correspond to the definition of the 1987 law, we chose to narrow our definition of disability by keeping the people who self-reported either a disability recognised by the COTOREP (the institution coping with the vocational rehabilitation of disabled person), or health problems having resulted in a partial or total working inability recognised by physicians salaried by the statutory health insurance or occupational physicians. This is what we call "officially recognised disability" in the remainder of the paper: 324 people have experienced at least one officially recognised disability during their lifetime. This population is removed from the final sample used for econometric analysis. Table 1 reports the sample statistics. The left part of the table compares the disabled with the other people before the reform, and the right part of the table reports the postreform comparison. We built a "problems during childhood dummy" variable that takes the value 1 in the following cases: mistreatment, war, violence at school, bad material living conditions, family conflicts, death of a close relative, illness of a close relative, separation from the family. Before the reform, we find that the disabled are more often women, have a lower education level, had more often problems during childhood and are older than the non-disabled persons. Therefore, matching is needed to control for these differences. After the reform, we find that the proportion of women is not significantly different between the disabled and non-disabled populations, but that the disabled are less educated, had more problems during childhood and are older. Therefore, matching is still needed. Figure 1 presents the number of officially recognized disabilities by onset year. It results from the structure of the sample, which is representative of the French population in 2006. The fact that there are fewer disabilities before the reform is related to the age structure of the sample. By definition, the oldest disabilities characterize the oldest persons. If there are younger persons in the sample, there will be less old disabilities. Table 1 shows that before the reform, the average age of the disabled is 39.2 in 1986, which is equivalent to 59.2 years at the time of the survey (2006). The post-reform sample exhibits an average disabled age of 50.1 in 2006. We also then assume that a part of this disabled population (before reform) has died before 2006. We only can observe in 2006 the survivors of disabled population. These differences explain why we have smaller numbers of old disabilities. Overall, 317 persons have enough data to perform a before-after analysis, 89 before the reform, 228 after the reform. The comparison group will be constituted by people with no handicap, accident or chronic disease. We have 8790 individuals with enough data to perform a before-after analysis. Figure 2 provides a naïve comparison of the labour market outcomes before and after the reform. This comparison is naïve because it does not account for the differences in age, education or childhood living conditions. The left part of the figure provides the employment rate before the onset of the disability. The pre-reform line is above the post-reform line because the situation is better in the labour market in the first period. We see that the lines are parallel before the onset of the disability (date 0 on the plot). This suggests that, if we control for the time trend (here related to the business cycle), there should be no significant difference between the pre-reform and post-reform employment outcome before the onset of the disability. The picture is quite different after the onset of the disability, on the right part of the figure.
While the pre-reform line shows an expected decrease in the employment rate and then a stabilization at a lower activity rate, the post-reform line shows a strongly decreasing employment rate. The gap between the pre-reform and the post-reform employment rates after the onset of the disability is called the naïve reform effect estimator. Our methodology aims at controlling for all the elements that could have created this gap, the confounding variables, to measure the true effect of the reform.
Methodology and estimation

Methodology
How can we evaluate the effect of the 1987 reform? If the effect of a disability had been evaluated in two separate papers, one before the reform and one after the reform, we would be tempted to compare the two evaluations and attribute its variation between the two dates to the reform. Unfortunately, this way to proceed could be misleading. Indeed, since a disability is often permanent, we cannot match the workers before and after the reform. 5 A worker with a disability in the first period will have few chances to get a second disability after the reform so that we cannot compare their effects on the same worker. Worse, even if we could find some cases with two disabilities, the impact of the second disability may well depend on the aftermath of the first disability and cannot provide an independent measurement of the impact of a disability after the reform. For more transient disabilities the case may exist, however; but, in this case, the worker will simply be older by definition and this may influence both the health status and the performance in the labour market. Overall, we would not get a good estimate of the reform.
More importantly, the disabled populations do not share the same characteristics before and after the reform. Table 2 shows the motivation for our method. If we compare the disabled population before and after the reform, we find a strong structural difference. The post-reform period includes less women, more educated workers and people who were older at the time of the disability onset. Since these three variables can potentially influence the effect of the disability, we have to control for their differences between the prereform and the post-reform disabled populations, to isolate the effect of the reform. Otherwise, we could wrongly attribute a disability effect variation to the reform while it is the effect of a change in the disabled population. 6 Our triple difference methodology does exactly this. Applying our method will drop the effect of the variation in the sample structure. Notice, however, that we cannot predict in which sense a correction will be made, if there is any. A higher education level may reduce the impact of a disability, but being older at the onset of the handicap may have the opposite effect.
We are left but with one option: to compare different workers who share similar characteristics before and after the reform. A disabled worker would first be matched with a control worker before the reform (the "before reform" difference-in-differences) and, simultaneously, matched with a future disabled worker and a future control worker (the "after reform" difference-in-differences), to get the difference of the two difference-in-differences (the "triple difference" estimator). However, the number of disabled workers is rarely sufficient to apply this method strictly. One solution is to regroup the disabled workers into categories which are relevant for the impact of the disabilities and to match them before and after the reform on these categories defined from the individual data. This is equivalent to take advantage of one property of the estimator of the effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT). As we show below, the global ATT can always be written as a weighted average of conditional ATTs, where the list of conditioning variables includes all the variables which have an influence on the ATTs [12] . Typically, ATTs depend on gender, education and the age at handicap. Each group defined by a combination of these variables has a specific causal effect and it is straightforward to write the global ATT as a weighted mean of these conditional effects.
This way to present the standard estimator has the following consequence: if the distribution of the conditioning variables changes over time in the disabled population, the global ATT could change even if none of the conditional effects does. Assume that the effect of a disability is more negative for the less educated [8] ; if the level of education increases over time, we will observe that the ATT is less negative because there are more educated people in the total population, not because the effect has decreased among the less educated workers. In other words, it is possible that the global ATT varies before and after the reform without any variation in the conditional ATTs. It is what we call a structural effect: the global disability effect varies because the population structure varies, not because a reform was implemented.
To provide a reliable estimate of the effect of the reform, we need to set a stable population structure over time, so as to highlight the effects which are specific to the reform. Which structure should we choose? Two basic structures look interesting: the structure before the reform, and the one after the reform. The first structure will give us the effect of the reform for the population of workers who were in the labour market before the reform. The second structure will give us the effect that the reform would have had on the end-of-period population if it had been in the labour market before the reform. Even though we report several estimations, we consider that the structure before the reform is more relevant for the following reason: the workers who were in the labour market before the reform have really experienced the reform; hence we should take this population as the benchmark of our study.
Double differences estimations
The two standard estimators, on the pre-and post-reform periods, are obtained by difference-in-differences with matching [11] . We present them below. We denote the periods before and after the reform by the superscript 0 and 1, respectively. We compare the value of a performance variable 1 year before and k years after the onset of the disability. 7 The labour market outcome difference around the disability onset for the worker i equals:
where y is the outcome variable. Consider now the period before the reform, the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) is estimated by:
where J(i) is the set of twins of worker i and their number: 8 The first condition, t j > t i + k , defines dynamic matching. We match with both the people who never got a disability and the ones who will have a disability later. The condition t j > t i + k means that the disability date of the twin t j must be posterior to the last value used in the difference of the disabled y i t i + k − y i t i − 1 , which is the year t i + k . We use both the workers with no health disease and the workers who will be disabled after the comparison period. The second condition, X i = X j , represents the exact matching condition on the vector of qualitative variables. The last condition,
, is the calliper matching on age. We impose a maximum difference of 3 years. We use the following notation for the average outcome of i 's twins:
and we rewrite the pre-reform ATT under the more convenient form:
To simplify notations, we write the difference in differences for the treated i as follows: so that:
is the estimate that we would get with the pre-reform data set. Similarly, we can define the post-reform ATT as:
where I 1 denotes both the set of the post-reform disabled workers and their number. It is the estimate that we would get from the post-reform dataset.
We now detail the influence of the disabled (i.e. the treated) characteristics on the ATTs. We consider gender (two groups), the level of education three groups) and the age at which the disability occurs (two groups). With these three categorical variables (see Table 2 ), we define 2 × 3 × 2 = 12 groups. We denote them g ∈ G , where G denotes both the set of groups and the number of groups. These groups exist both before and after the reform. It is an important common support condition between the treated of the two periods. Table 2 shows that there are enough observations in each group. For each group, we can compute an ATT by selecting the corresponding treated. Let I g r be the index set of the disabled group g during the period r ∈ {0, 1} . They define a partition of the treated.
We have:
The conditional ATT of group g in period r is defined by:
Therefore, the global ATT estimator can be rewritten as a weighted mean of the conditional ATT estimators: 
Triple differences
We first present the "naive" triple difference estimator, which does not account for the distributional differences between the pre-reform and post-reform disabled persons. It corresponds to Fig. 2 . We then show how this estimator can be improved to get an evaluation of the reform. The naive triple difference estimator is equal to and the first term is the only one which is related to the reform since it implies a variation in the ATTs over time, Â TT . The first term is, in fact, the average variation of the ATTs, where the weight is the disabled population structure before the reform, w g 0 ; we denote it it measures the effect of the reform on the disabled who were present in the labour market before the reform took place. The second term is the distributional effect:
It measures the ATT variation attributable to a change of the disabled population. We could also, of course, have written this difference according to the disabled population structure after the reform: which gives the effect that the reform would have had on the population present in the labour market after the reform:
and the associated distributional component:
The estimations were performed with SAS 9.4.
Results
The sample composition is very different before and after the reform (Table 1 ). In the pre-reform period, the proportion of women is significantly higher in the disabled group than in the group with no disease. This is not the case during the post-reform period. There is also an increase in the average education level between both periods, and the differences between the disabled and the no-disease groups remain significant. There are also strong differences in the employment rate: the individuals with no disease have 9.9 points higher employment rate than the disabled individuals in the prereform period. This gap increases up to 33.1 points in the post-reform period (see Table 1 ). We estimate which part of this outcome difference can be explained by the reform, by status (public-private).
The estimations are reported in Table 3 . We provide a step-by-step presentation of our findings: difference-in-differences without matching (that we provide for comparison), DiD with matching, (that we use in the evaluation) and the triple difference decomposition. For each of the three estimations, we present the ATT of a disability on employment during the 5 years following the disability. 9 We comment on the results in percentage points (pp.).
The standard DiD analyses (without matching), before and after the reform, show that a disability would have a strong detrimental effect on private employment and a weak effect on public employment during the 5 years following the onset of disability. The employment rate of employees who have experienced a disability in t i decreases by 12.7 percentage points (pp.) in t i + 1 compared to t i − 1 for the pre-reform subsample and decreases by 24.5 pp for the post-reform sample. The triple difference naive estimator of the reform effect is simply the difference of these two effects. By comparing the outcomes for both samples during the 5 years following the disability, the adverse effect is higher for the post-reform sample. The difference in ATTs reaches − 11.8 pp in t i + 1 and increases over time, with a peak of − 28.8 pp in t i + 4 . We find that these results are partly driven by the differences in the disabled populations before and after the reform.
The second set of estimates accounts for the lagged variables (occupation, type of labour contract, working time) and
9 By construction, the effect on employment is the sum of the effects on public and private employments.
Table 3
Effect of the 1987 reform on the probability to be employed Consider the evaluation of the effect of a disability 2 years after its appearance (t + 2 panel). In the pre-reform sample, there are 84 treated. The DiD estimator of the disability effect is − 12.3 pp on the employment rate. After the reform, there are 220 treated. The DiD estimator of the disability effect is − 29.2 pp on the employment rate. The DiD estimation of the reform is a reduction of 29.2 pp-12.3 pp = 16.9 pp of the employment rate. Now, consider the matching estimators. 82 treated out of 84 can be matched in the pre-reform sample. The disability reduces their employment rate by Â TT 0 = −12.3 pp before the reform. After the reform, the reduction equals Â TT 1 = −27.2 pp . According to the DiD with matching estimation, the reform reduced the disabled employment rate by 14.8 pp This latter figure can be decomposed in two ways. For a population with the same characteristics as the pre-reform disabled the effect of the reform is R 0 = −13.1 pp (significant at 10%). If we consider the characteristics of the post-reform disabled, the effect of the reform is stronger at R 1 = −17.6 pp (significant at 5%)
DiD difference-in-differences, pp percentage points *Significant at 5% † Significant at 10% the time-constant individual variables (gender, education level, having been raised by one's parents, problems during childhood). We proceed by an exact dynamic matching on these confounding variables. The estimated effect of the disability is always reduced when a matching is performed, at all time horizons. In the short run ( t i + 1 ), the estimated difference in performance before and after the reform is reduced after matching estimation, from − 11.8 pp (significant at 5%) to − 9.2 pp (significant at 10%). The difference reaches 6 pp for the long-run effect ( t i + 5). Nevertheless, this first matching is not sufficient, as suggested in Table 2 . The population structure before and after the reform is very different in terms of education levels, women's proportion and age at disability onset. The higher education level could protect the post-reform population against the negative effect of a disability on labour outcomes. Yet, contrary to this first assumption, the highest proportion of women in the post-reform could increase the detrimental effect of disabilities on employment. Indeed, the disabilities which affect women are more often, like chronic diseases, detrimental on professional paths than those related to men, such as accidents [3] . We know that chronic diseases are especially damaging for employment. Moreover, work disutility following a health shock is greater for women (Paringer, 1983).
The effect of the per se reform can be measured either with the pre-reform disabled population benchmark or with the post-reform one. Considering the prereform benchmark, we find that in t i + 1 , the − 9.2 pp ATT difference comes, on the one hand, from a reform effect of R 0 = −11.4 pp and, on the other hand, from a distributional change (in gender, education and age at disability onset), which can be computed in the following way: Since
Overall, the effect of the reform is not significant after 1 year. Therefore, the population that had the same gender, level of education and age at disability onset's distribution as the pre-reform population has experienced a more important decrease in their employment rate after the reform than a direct comparison would suggest. But we could also consider the distribution of the post-reform disabled population and we would obtain a decrease of 10 pp after 1 year, not significant at the 10% level. Overall the effects of the reform become significant from the second year after the disability onset. Whatever the measure used, the disabled workers are worse off after the reform. Using the pre-reform structure, they lose − 13 pp after 2 years (significant at 10%) and then − 19.6 pp, − 22.8 pp and − 19.2 pp on the following years (significant at 5%). A similar conclusion would have been reached, if we use the post-reform disabled structure.
The negative effects of the reform are confirmed if we distinguish two post-reform periods 10 : 1988-1996 and 1997-2006 ("Appendix", Table 4 ). In the first period, the law should enter progressively into application, while in the second period, 10 years after the law, the reform should be fully operational. We find that the effect is barely significant during the first period, except after 4 years, while the effect is strongly negative for all lags in the second, post-reform, period. This means that the effect of the reform has been increasingly negative on the probability to be employed. Using the pre-reform benchmark, the effect in the second post-reform period ranges from − 25.3 pp 1 year after the disability, up to − 39.4 pp 5 years after the disability. We conclude that the reform has driven disabled workers out of the labour market.
To conclude, we find that the 1987 Law had a detrimental effect on the employment of disabled people. However, after segregating by sector, we find that this result holds for the private sector only. Generally, the reform is neutral in the public sector; it does not promote or reduce the employment of disabled people. The only significant effect on public employment is obtained with the post-reform disabled structure: there would be a small negative effect 2 years after the onset of the disability, but it is limited both in magnitude (− 3.7 pp) and significance (10% level).
Discussion and conclusion
We performed an original study focused on the impact of the French Disabled Workers Act of 1987 on disabled workers' employment, based on a triple difference matching technique. Our study evaluates how a combination of financial penalties and quota modified the incentives of firms to hire disabled workers. However, unlike Wagner et al. [26] and Lalive et al. [16] , we do not use firm panel but individual panel. We cannot disentangle the firms according to which are faced the obligation of employment of disabled workers (20 workers in France). Our strategy is then different and consists of observing the employment rate of the disabled people before and after the implementation of the reform.
Such an evaluation has not been undertaken before in France. Overall, the 1987 reform had a negative impact on the employment of disabled workers. Our findings point out that the reform had been counterproductive in the private sector and neutral in the public sector. The year following the onset of a disability is not characterised by significant differences of performance between the potential beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries of the 1987 Law. Our results indicate that, from the second year, the potential beneficiaries of the 1987 Law have been disadvantaged in the labour market compared to the disabled people who did not benefit from it. Besides, this disadvantage is increasing over time; the employment rate decreases by 13 pp (points of percentage) during the second year, and by 19 pp on the fifth year.
We can assume that a large majority of private companies has preferred the payment of a contribution to the direct and indirect hiring costs associated with the employment of disabled workers. By enabling firms to abide by the legal employment obligation without hiring any disabled workers, this reform probably had a counterproductive impact on the employment of disabled people. For instance, in 2005, according to the French Ministry of Labour, approximately 100,000 establishments had to comply with the law: almost one-third preferred paying the financial contribution and did not comply with the Law. Other arguments may explain the reduction in the employment rate of the disabled workers after 1987. In France, early retirement plans for the 55 years old and more have existed since 1980 with the implementation of the special allowances of the National Employment Fund. The law of 1982 has allowed the opening of the right to full retirement at 60 years old, as well as the implementation of contracts of solidarity, conditioning early retirement plans to the hiring of young or unemployed people. This dynamic of early retirement affects the populations "before" and "after". Early retired persons and people exempted from job search are more numerous over the period 1988-2006 than over the period [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] , and disabled workers have more incentives to stop working than the workers in good health. This could explain more frequent exits from the labour market for the disabled people eligible to the 1987 Law.
The evaluation of the 1987 Law using data from the 2006 wave of the SIP survey also raise a standard issue. There could be a selection bias because the survey is restricted to people who were alive in 2006 with a disability which first occurred between 1968 and 2006. This definition excludes the people who had the most severe disabilities a long time ago, because their life expectation is lower. Following this argument, our sample would include people with less severe disabilities before 1987 than after. However, we match these people on gender, education and age at disability, so that this argument holds as far as the severity of the disability cannot be controlled by these variables. Also, we cannot control for the memory bias which can potentially affect the self-reporting of individuals 40 years after a disability onset. However, we use the strongest form of disability, an officially recognised disability, which is more likely to mark the personal life of individuals and which gives right to an official card. Consequently, we consider that the reported date for the onset of the disability is reliable.
It is, however, difficult to disentangle strategic behaviours and moral hazard behaviours between supply and demand sides in the labour market. Firms' behaviours do not seem to have been influenced by economic incentives. We could suppose as well, following the example of Gneezy and Rustichini [10] , that the introduction of a penalty or a tax reveals information in a situation of uncertainty. The introduction of the tax creates a market-oriented frame in which the obligation to hire disabled people is replaced by a financial compensation, which could be interpreted as the price firms pay to the community for escaping their social role of integrating persons with disabilities in the labour market.
The 2005 Law decided to strengthen financial penalties for firms not complying with the quota of 6%. To our knowledge, no study explores the effect of this new reform on employment of disabled people. However, based on Austrian data, Lalive et al. [16] point out that firms facing the obligation to employ disabled workers are hiring more disabled workers than similar firms without this coercion. We can then assume that the sanctions, at a higher level, may affect French firms' demand for disabled workers.
Finally, our data does not allow us to estimate the effects of non-employment traps. If an officially recognised disability situation provides a good financial compensation compared to employment, it can generate disincentives to work. However, since we match comparable disabled individuals before and after the reform, it should be of limited relevance for our study.
